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INTRODUCTION  
You, by giving in, would save yourself from disaster . . . your actual resources are too 
scanty to give you a chance of survival against the forces that are opposed to you at this 
moment. You will therefore be showing an extraordinary lack of common sense if . . . 
you still fail to reach a conclusion wiser than anything you have mentioned so far.[1]  
A differentiation arises between ourselves, the we group or in-group, and everybody else, 
or the others-groups, out-group. The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group 
and the hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The 
exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside.[2]  
The above statements represent two disparate and theoretically significant bodies of 
literature in the study of conflict. The first concerns itself with the study of external 
coercion through diplomacy or coercive diplomacy, and the second, often referred to as 
the in-group/out-group hypothesis or the theory of conflict and cohesion, is guided by the 
central proposition that involvement in external conflict increases internal cohesion. The 
former statement is a demonstration of an external power's use of coercive diplomacy to 
force the target to comply with its objectives without resorting to military force. The 
latter statement attempts to explain why the target is likely to become internally cohesive 
in reaction to external pressure.  
Coercive diplomacy employs threats or limited force to persuade a target state to stop 
short of a goal (Type A) or reverse action already implemented (Type B) without 
escalating into a fully blown war. Little is known, however, about the Type C variant of 
coercive diplomacy; namely, the ability of an external power to persuade a target to not 
simply reverse an action or stop short of an objective, but more importantly to relinquish 
power or make fundamental changes within its government.[3] Given the offensive 
nature of this variant of coercive diplomacy the state that employs the strategy risks 
fragmenting its own domestic coalition and is unlikely to secure sufficient domestic 
support that is necessary in order to pursue its coercive diplomatic objectives. It is noted 
that while diplomatic success under Type C conditions are not impossible they are highly 
improbable.[4]  
The coercive diplomacy literature, therefore, argues that under Type C conditions an 
external power's own internal fragmentation weakens that state's ability to persist in what 
it demands from the target. According to the literature on conflict and cohesion, since the 
Type C variant of coercive diplomacy represents the most severe form of external 
pressure, the intensity of this external threat should increase the target's internal cohesion 
and his resolve to resist. Essentially, the Type C demands of an external power are 
expected to deepen the target's internal cohesion and resistance, which increases the 
possibility that the crisis can only be resolved by military force. While the theory of 
coercive diplomacy emphasizes the external power's internal fragmentation that weakens 
his resolve to persist, conflict and cohesion theory emphasizes the target's internal 
cohesion that strengthens his resolve to resist. Both theories agree, albeit for different 
reasons, that achieving compliance under Type C conditions is improbable.  
This article attempts to answer a central question: Under what conditions is Type C 
coercive diplomacy likely to succeed? It is argued that the success of Type C coercive 
diplomacy is possible even when the coercive power has little domestic support for the 
measure. The success of the strategy is a function of several factors: the time duration 
over which conflict takes place with an external power; the subsequent stress among the 
target's coalition members; the ensuing changes in the internal distribution of power 
within the coalition; and coalition member's adoption of multiple and competing 
bargaining solutions to resolve the conflict with the external power are important 
domestic variables that interacted with each other as well as with external coercion to 
erode and fragment the cohesion within the coalition which facilitates defection and 
ultimately produce compliance under C Type diplomatic conditions.  
The case of the Clinton administration's policy towards Haiti's de facto military junta is 
the most recent demonstration of the Type C variant of coercive diplomacy. In the case of 
Haiti, it is argued that sanctions indirectly fragmented the de facto coalition and 
politically weakened the military leadership's position within the Haitian military and its 
will to resist an invasion. American diplomatic pressure and President Clinton's threat to 
use military force to eject the junta, while necessary to the final resolution of the conflict, 
would not have been sufficient to convince the de facto junta to cede power peacefully 
without offering some resistance to the American troops that entered Haiti.  
American Type C Coercion of the Haitian Junta  
Some students of Haitian politics have argued that it is simply wrong to characterize US 
policy toward the Haitian junta in terms of pursuing Type C coercive objectives. These 
scholars argue that the policy objectives of both the Bush and Clinton administrations 
were intended to force the de facto regime to accept the creation of a government of 
national consensus - where political power would have been shared between Aristide's 
popular democratic sector and the military and business elite who had toppled President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government. In fact it is argued that US officials were quite 
sympathetic to the interests of the Haitian military and by attempting to force an 
accommodation between the Haitian Right and Left, the Bush and Clinton 
administrations sought to use the Right to weaken the power of the democratic sector and 
contain the socialist excesses of Aristide.[5] This depiction of US objectives toward the 
Haitian junta is correct, but it does not violate the essential theoretical requirements for 
understanding US policy toward Haiti in terms of Type C coercion. By definition, a state 
pursues the Type C variant of coercive diplomacy when it forces the target to make 
fundamental changes within its government or to completely relinquish its hold of 
political power.[6] Since the Clinton administration's primary objective was to initially 
force the de facto junta to make fundamental changes within the regime, such as an 
acceptance of a political accommodation with deposed Aristide, and then later demanded 
the termination of the regime itself, both objectives concerning the Haitian junta are fully 
consistent with the theoretical conceptualization of Type C coercive diplomacy.  
The argument presented here begins in the next section with a discussion of the theories 
of coercive diplomacy and conflict and cohesion. In the development of this argument 
aspects from both theories are integrated to develop theoretical propositions that specify 
the necessary pre-conditions that make compliance under Type C conditions possible. An 
analysis of US diplomatic efforts in restoring Haiti's experiment with democracy serves 
to empirically test the theoretical propositions and the argument that is advanced in this 
article. The concluding section discusses the foreign policy implications of the argument 
in light of its relevance to recent policy discussions regarding the removal of the Iraqi 
leadership from power via Type C coercive diplomacy.  
The Theory of Coercive Diplomacy  
The requirements for successful coercive diplomacy are that the external power must 
create in the target's mind the fear of unacceptable cost, which will weaken that state's 
motivation to resist. Essentially, coercive diplomacy uses threats not to physically impair 
the target, but to primarily destroy that state's will to resist.[7] There are three central 
variables that help explain the success of coercive diplomatic efforts. First, there must be 
an asymmetry of motivation that favors the external power employing coercive 
diplomacy. Second, the target must be sufficiently convinced that the punishment for 
non-compliance is credible and unacceptable. And third, the external power must be able 
to employ the appropriate mix of positive incentives and negative threats.[8]  
Asymmetry of Motivation  
The external power's choice of diplomatic demands will affect the strength of the target's 
motivation to resist and the strength of the external's power's own motivation to persist in 
the deployment of coercive diplomacy. Motivation is a function of each party's 
conception of what it has at stake in a given crisis, how important are the issues that are 
at stake to both parties, and what cost is each party willing to pay in order to protect or 
advance their respective interests. If the external power demands something from the 
target that is more important to it than the target, then the asymmetry of motivation 
strongly favors the external power and under these conditions coercive diplomacy is 
likely to succeed. On the other hand, if the external power demands something from the 
target that extends beyond its own vital interests, then the asymmetry of motivation 
favors the target and the external power's coercive diplomatic efforts are likely to fail.[9] 
In addition, the more extensive the external power's demands become, as is the case with 
Type C diplomacy, and the more disconnected they appear to its primary security 
interests, the more unlikely will the external power be able to secure domestic support for 
his coercive diplomatic efforts. Under these conditions the asymmetry of motivation to 
resist favors the target over the external power and coercive diplomacy is likely fail.[10]  
Does this variable provide an adequate explanation of the successful diplomatic outcome 
in Haiti? Given the Bush and Clinton administration's Type C demands on the Haitian 
junta the asymmetry of motivation was disadvantageous to the US government and 
favorable to Haiti's de facto military junta. Little domestic consensus existed regarding 
the policy to remove the Haitian junta from power; neither was there consensus over the 
means through which coercion should be exercised. The CIA, the Pentagon and 
congressional Republicans opposed the restoration of President Aristide,[11] while the 
American public and congressional Democrats stood opposed to any talk of the use of 
force.[12] Given the successful diplomatic outcome in the Haitian crisis, the asymmetry 
of motivation that should have weakened the Clinton administration's resolve to persist 
and strengthened the Haitian junta's resolve to resist is not a reliable predictor of the 
diplomatic outcome in the Haitian crisis under Type C conditions.  
The Fear of Unacceptable Punishment  
For coercive diplomacy to succeed the external power's coercive punishment for non-
compliance must be perceived by the target to be so overwhelmingly credible and potent 
that it becomes convinced that compliance with the external power's demands is the best 
course of action rather than accept the cost of non-compliance.[13] The major problem 
with this variable is that it is difficult to draw inferences between the target's perception 
of the external power's credibility and its motivation to comply or resist the external 
power's demands. This problem is prevalent in the conventional explanation of why the 
Haitian junta eventually complied with US demands after successfully resisting US 
pressure from 1991 to September 1994. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 
asserted that democracy was restored to Haiti because "diplomacy was backed by 
power."[14] This assertion assumes that the Haitian junta's perception of US credibility 
for the use of force changed by 1994, as a result of President Clinton's ultimatum and the 
last minute mission of Jimmy Carter, Colin Powell and Sam Nunn who supposedly 
convinced the junta that a military invasion would follow if they refused to cede power.  
The problem with this explanation is that it assumes that the US threat to use force was 
more believable in 1994 than at any other time during the crisis. This assumption is 
simply not supported by the events in the Haitian case. Ultimatums and the threat to use 
force by the US and the Organization of American States (OAS) were nothing new 
during the diplomatic crisis with the Haitian junta. In fact, as the Harlan County 
incident[15] showed, in October 1993 the Haitian junta forcefully blocked the entry of 
US troops who were sent to oversee the implementation of the ill-fated Governors Island 
Accord which established the terms for the process of democratic restoration in Haiti. If 
the Haitian junta stood firm and forcefully repelled the entry of US troops into Haiti and 
in the process sank the Governors Island Accord, why would they simply comply as a 
result of another ultimatum and threat to use military force? It is, therefore, difficult to 
draw direct inferences between the Haitian junta's motivation to comply with US external 
pressure and their perceptions of the credibility of the US to use military force against 
them.  
Positive Incentives and Negative Threats  
The theory of coercive diplomacy claims that the success of the strategy is also 
contingent on the external power's credible implementation of an appropriate mix of both 
positive inducements and negative punishments that encourages the target to comply. The 
assumption here is that the mixture of incentives and coercive measures changes the 
preferences among the target's central decision makers and weakens their motivation to 
resist. But the variable does not specify the conditions under which that mix can change 
the target's preferences. What is the "appropriate" mixture of incentives and coercive 
measures and how does it actually weaken the target's resolve to resist external coercion? 
Without specification it is difficult to infer that changes in the target's preference to 
comply is attributable to the mixture of diplomatic carrots and sticks.  
The variables that are central to the theory of coercive diplomacy, by themselves, do not 
explain the diplomatic outcome in Haiti. The exclusive focus on the external power's 
motivation and the target's perceived credibility of the instruments of external coercion 
limits the explanatory power of the theory's central variables. By integrating aspects of 
coercive diplomacy with the variables that are posited by the theory of conflict and 
cohesion important insights emerge that specify the links between external coercion and 
its effect on the target's motivation toward greater resistance or compliance.  
The Theory of Conflict and Cohesion  
The proposition that external conflict increases internal cohesion has been a major area of 
social science research for the past six decades. Since a full review of this expansive 
literature is beyond the scope of this article, discussion in this section is limited to a 
review of the necessary pre-conditions or intervening variables that are identified by the 
literature.  
The original formulation of the proposition is credited to the work of sociologists. These 
theorists recognized that external conflict does not necessarily increase internal cohesion. 
The proposition holds only in the presence of certain intervening variables. First, the 
target's coalition must exist before the onset of conflict with the external power and must 
see itself as a coalition. Second, the external power must be seen and recognized as a 
threat to each individual member of the coalition[16] and all members must share equally 
in the suffering and danger that results from the external conflict.[17] A third intervening 
variable concerns itself with the internal structure of the target's coalition. 
Anthropologists have noted that conflict with an external enemy increases internal 
cohesion only when the target has a centralized structure of power that allows it to 
forcefully intervene domestically to maintain cohesion among members of its 
coalition.[18] A centralized political system allows the target to effectively utilize force 
to coerce coalition members in order to maintain internal cohesion during the conflict 
with the external enemy. The greater the degree of centralized power the greater the 
degree of internal cohesion.[19]  
An additional set of intervening variables can be drawn from the social psychology 
literature on group dynamics. First, the target's internal cohesion decreases if there is no 
solution to the crisis with the external enemy. Second, the target's internal cohesion 
increases if there is a cooperative solution to the crisis. Third, internal cohesion will 
disintegrate if the target's coalition members adopt competitive solutions to the crisis with 
the external enemy.[20] This outcome can be attributed to the fact that individual 
coalition members may find the coalition powerless to deal with the external enemy, and 
may believe that the individual efforts of each member is the best way to resolve the 
crisis.[21] Therefore, each coalition member must see the conflict with the external 
enemy as solvable by the efforts of the coalition and see the coalition as a source of 
support.[22] Fourth, internal cohesion increases when the rewards to individual coalition 
members for staying with the coalition are greater than the rewards for defection.[23] 
Fifth, internal cohesion is said to decrease as the time duration of the external conflict 
increases. Some researchers have noted that when "disaster threatens over a long period 
of time, the cohesive forces that hold a group together are subject to strain [that result in] 
various forms of bizarre and schismatic behavior."[24]  
The major limitation of the social science literature is that there is no conceptual 
agreement as to how the independent variable (external conflict) and the dependent 
variable (internal cohesion) should be defined and operationalized. In sociology some 
researchers distinguish between conflict and competition while others do not. Other 
researchers argue for a general definition of external conflict while others insist on 
creating separate categories of conflict so that they can be studied differently.[25] While 
sociologists recognize the conceptual confusion of the independent variable there is 
limited discussion and recognition of the conceptual ambiguity of the dependent variable.  
The same is true of the social psychology literature.[26] Some social psychologists tend 
to dichotomize the independent variable in terms of the existence or non-existence of 
external threat. Still others argue that the independent variable should be measured in 
terms of the different levels of external threat so that all possible thresholds of conflict 
can be included in the analysis.[27] Social psychologists are equally divided regarding 
the definition and operationalization of cohesion. Some researchers suggest using various 
dimensions and definitions of cohesion while others do not.[28]  
The Exogenous and Endogenous Variables  
In this analysis the independent variable (external coercion) is defined in terms of the 
various levels of negative threats and positive incentives that can be utilized by an 
external power against the target. These instruments of external coercion not only vary in 
the degree of their intensity, but also can escalate through varying thresholds ranging 
from economic sanctions, naval blockade, limited military strikes to direct military 
intervention. Each level and intensity of negative threat is coupled with the proportionate 
level of concessions to provide incentive to the target to help induce his compliance.  
Throughout this analysis the term coalition refers to the informal agreement and implicit 
understanding among political actors to coordinate their strategies to increase their 
collective power vis- à-vis other political actors with conflicting interests. The dependent 
variable (coalition cohesion) is defined in terms of "the resultant of all forces acting on 
members to remain in the [coalition]."[29] These forces are determined jointly by how 
power is internally organized within the coalition, the attractiveness of the coalition to its 
members, the attractiveness of competing coalitions or alternative options, and the 
benefits and costs associated with leaving the coalition. The attractiveness of a coalition 
consists of two components: intrinsic attraction and instrumental attraction.[30] Intrinsic 
attraction refers to coalition members having strong preferences for each other based on a 
shared ideology, values or a set of beliefs. Instrumental attraction refers to coalition 
members having an attraction toward the attainment of a specific goal that the coalition 
mediates for its individual members. Therefore, coalition membership becomes important 
because it represents the means by which individual members can attain their goals.  
Coalition cohesion is, therefore, conceived as a function of the internal organization of 
power within the coalition, which is measured in terms of the centralization of power and 
the use of coercion to increase the cost of defection. The greater the degree of centralized 
power or attempts to alter the distribution of power, the lower the coalition's 
attractiveness, the higher the attraction of alternative options, the higher the benefits of 
defection, and hence the lower the level of the coalition's internal cohesion.  
By integrating aspects of coercive diplomacy with the theory of conflict and cohesion the 
following propositions emerge that specify the conditions in which compliance under C 
Type conditions is possible. First, as the time duration of external coercion (negative 
threats and positive incentives) increases, stress among domestic coalition members 
increases and internal cohesion decreases. Second, increasing levels of external coercion 
(negative threats and positive incentives) increases internal cohesion only when, in 
response to external coercion, domestic coalition members adopt the same bargaining 
strategy to resolve the crisis with the external power. Third, increasing levels of external 
coercion (negative threats and positive incentives) lowers internal cohesion only when, in 
response to external coercion, domestic coalition members adopt multiple and competing 
bargaining strategies to resolve the crisis with the external power. Fourth, increasing 
levels of external coercion (negative threats and positive incentives) increases internal 
cohesion only when, in response to external coercion, attempts to centralize power 
internally increase the distribution of benefits for all members of the coalition. Finally, 
increasing levels of external coercion (negative threats and positive incentives) lowers 
internal cohesion only when, in response to external coercion, attempts to alter the 
internal distribution of power increase the distribution of benefits accrued to some 
members of the coalition while reducing the benefits enjoyed by others.  
The Haitian De Facto Coalition  
The Haitian junta was composed of a coalition that included the military high command, 
the business elite and the paramilitary group, named the Front for the Advancement and 
Progress of Haiti (FRAPH). This coalition was the resurrection of the old Duvalier 
regime that ruled Haiti for much of the country's political history. FRAPH merely 
became the new name for the old tonton macoute - the paramilitary organization that was 
the repressive arm of the Duvalier dictatorship. The de facto regime not only saw itself as 
a coalition before the conflict with the United States, it also saw itself as the legitimate 
heir to govern Haiti in the post-Duvalier era. The coalition's structure of political power 
was centralized within the military high command, which included three principal 
players: General Raoul Cedras, General Philippe Biamby, and police chief and FRAPH 
leader, Lt. Col. Michael Francois. The essential intrinsic attraction among members of the 
de facto coalition is that they all were ideologically opposed to Haiti's democratic process 
and to the prospect of its restoration. But beyond their ideological affinities, it was the 
instrumental attraction that defined the goals and preferences of the coalition members. 
The policies of the Aristide government posed the greatest threat to the instrumental 
goals of each member of the coalition.  
Most members of the military high command cared about maintaining their political 
control over the army, protecting its budgets and securing wealth through narcotics 
trafficking.[31] Cedras maintained policy preferences in regard to specific issues that 
were independent from Francois, FRAPH and the army's rank and file. The bureaucratic 
experience of Cedras gained while serving at the military academy and at military 
headquarters developed in him policy preferences about the army that were largely 
"technocratic" in nature. He was largely considered to be a "military leader who 
genuinely wished to minimize his role in politics, professionalize the armed services, and 
develop a separate and competent civilian police force."[32] The reform of the Haitian 
army would strengthen the military's command and control structure, which would 
provide the army's high command with greater control over the enlisted men and thus 
avert the Haitian army's tradition of coups d'état against their commanding officers.  
The policies of the Aristide government threatened the power of the military high 
command. During his first year in office, Aristide attempted to exert control over the 
army in order to diminish its power and the potential threat that it posed for his 
democratic government. Attempts were made to reform the military personnel by 
dismissing Duvalierists members of the high command and replacing them with officers 
who were politically loyal to Aristide and supportive of democratization.[33] In his first 
year in office, the Aristide government also slashed the army's budget by US$4 million 
and proposed limiting the budget to just US$25 million for fiscal year 1992.[34] The 
government also established the anti-narcotic council, which developed a national policy 
against drug trafficking in Haiti and strengthened US-Haitian bilateral cooperative efforts 
in narcotic interdiction, seizures and the sharing of narcotic intelligence.[35]  
In restructuring of the military personnel, the Aristide government attempted to dismantle 
the paramilitary. Since the existence of a paramilitary organization was incompatible with 
the process of democratization in Haiti, FRAPH, more than any member of the de facto 
coalition, stood to lose the most in the event of Aristide's return. During the crisis with 
the US government, FRAPH sought to bolster its power within the de facto coalition to 
enhance its capabilities to effectively repress the population and eliminate the pro-
democracy opposition. Moreover, by consolidating its power within the coalition, 
FRAPH could challenge and displace the military's high command and usurp control of 
the army to coerce and discourage potential defections in order to maintain cohesion.  
It was important to the Haitian business elite in the manufacturing, contracting and 
assembling sectors of the economy to keep wages low and thereby increase the process of 
capital accumulation while providing the necessary incentive to attract mobile foreign 
capital investment on which the Haitian private sector is heavily dependent. By proposing 
to raise the minimum wage, the Aristide government threatened a core interest of the 
Haitian business elite. The fear of the business elite was that Aristide's proposed 
minimum wage increases would encourage semi-skilled and skilled workers to demand 
higher wages for themselves. And given Haiti's high cost for non-labor factors of 
production such as port fees, electricity and telecommunications, Haitian companies 
balked at being forced to pay the additional costs in wages.[36]  
External Coercion, Internal Cohesion and Resistance, 1991-93  
Two days after the 30 September coup toppled President Aristide the Organization of 
American States (OAS) held an emergency meeting at its headquarters in Washington, 
DC. The US government strongly denounced the de facto military junta and pledged its 
support for Aristide's restoration. In addressing the member states of the OAS, US 
Secretary of State James Baker noted "this junta is illegal . . . [and] until Aristide's 
government is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah, without friends, without 
support and without a future. This coup must not and will not succeed . . .. It is 
imperative that we agree for the sake of Haitian democracy and the cause of democracy 
throughout the hemisphere, to act collectively to defend the legitimate government of 
President Aristide."[37]  
In June 1991, the OAS spoke of supporting "any measures deemed appropriate"[38] to 
deal with a coup in a member state. In October 1991, OAS foreign ministers mentioned 
reserving the right "to adopt all additional measures which may be necessary and 
appropriate"[39] to resolve the crisis in Haiti and reinstate Aristide. By 8 October 1991, 
the OAS and UN resolutions recommended the imposition of a voluntary trade and oil 
embargo against Haiti, which exempted humanitarian aid such as medicine, food and air 
travel. The Bush administration would later impose a separate embargo, that became 
effective by 15 November 1991.[40]  
In reaction to the international pressure for Aristide's return the de facto coalition 
centralized and consolidated its power within Haiti's parliament and remained united in 
its defiance of the US and the international community's demands for the restoration of 
the democratic process. To forge a united opposition to block implementation of any 
agreement with the international community that could result in Aristide's return, it was 
necessary to purge and coerce those members within the Haitian parliament who were 
supportive or sympathetic to Aristide and the democratic process. This was the fate of 
pro-Aristide supporter Robert Malval, the Haitian prime minister appointed by the 
deposed president. The de facto regime's opposition to the Malval leadership in 
parliament was well-known among Haitian parliamentarians. With mounting 
international pressure for Aristide's return General Cedras publicly warned that, "he 
would no longer support the Prime Minister position . . .. [And] that he would no longer 
be responsible for protecting the [Malval government]."[41] Privately, however, plans 
were underway for the removal of Prime Minster Malval and other pro-Aristide ministers 
from the interim government and for the appointment of members of the de facto 
coalition to leadership positions in the Haitian parliament. US Defense intelligence noted:  
General Raoul Cedras and Police Chief Lieutenant Colonel Michel Francois are planning 
a coup d'état to remove Prime Minister Malval from his position during the week of 
October 18, 1993. Cedras and Francois plan to form a coalition government composed of 
military and civilian officials. These officials are to be hand picked from those 
Dominican Republic . . .. If Malval is removed the [parliament] will be composed of 
individuals who oppose President's Aristide's return to Haiti.[42]  
The Junta's threats and intimidation ultimately forced the resignation of Malval in 
October 1993. The de facto coalition's coercion of parliament, moreover, was most 
evident during the first round of negotiations with the US and the OAS. By 5 October 
1991, an OAS delegation was dispatched to Port-au-Prince to force the junta to relinquish 
power. The delegation met briefly with US Ambassador Alvin Adams, General Cedras, 
and members of the general staff, but was forced to return to Washington on 7 October 
after agitated enlisted soldiers arrived at the airport where the meeting was being held, 
seriously threatened the security of the OAS delegation and broke up the negotiations. 
Meanwhile, a group of 200 soldiers seized the legislative palace and demanded that the 
National Assembly members (who were waiting for the return of their leadership from 
the OAS negotiations) sign a petition that invoked Article 149 of the constitution, 
removing Aristide from office. The petition was ratified the day before the OAS returned 
to Washington, DC.[43]  
The first major diplomatic agreement between the international community and the de 
facto junta for restoring democracy in Haiti came with the signing of the Washington 
Protocol on 23 February 1992. The agreement included, first, amnesty for the Haitian 
junta and other supporters of the 1991 coup; second, Aristide's respect for parliamentary 
legislation ratified after the coup (including Cedras' appointment as head of the military 
through 1994); third, the lifting of the embargo immediately after the ratification of Rene 
Theodore (an Aristide nominee) as the new prime minister; fourth, the inauguration of a 
government of national consensus between the Aristide's Lavalas party and the Haitian 
business elite who financed the coup; and fifth, an agreement to hold new presidential 
elections in 1995 without reclaiming the years lost from the five-year term as a result of 
coup.[44]  
The de facto regime, however, utilized both political bribery and intimidation to block 
domestic ratification of the Washington Protocol. The de facto provisional government 
paid $50,000 to Haiti's de facto parliamentary deputies to vote against the Washington 
Protocol.[45] In addition, the provisional government also bought off segments of Haiti's 
armed forces to pressure Cedras into rejecting further negotiations with the US for 
Aristide's return. Members of Haiti's general staff routinely received an unofficial 
supplement to their paychecks each month. This money did not come from the standard 
pay account and was provided in cash and given only to members of the Haitian general 
staff. [46] US Defense intelligence reported:  
The [de facto] government has been dispatching monthly stipends to soldiers of the 
Headquarters Defense Units (HDU) in a bid to buy their support for opposition to 
negotiations and for moving to elections. The bonuses are being paid monthly out of non-
Defense ministry funds and are paid to both officers and enlisted personnel. Members of 
the [de facto] government have met a number of times with HDU officers and enlisted 
personnel in an effort to sway them to their cause.[47]  
Police Chief and FRAPH leader Lt. Col. Michael Francois used FRAPH to intimidate 
parliamentarians to secure their opposition to the Washington Protocol. In recognizing 
the obstacle that Francois presented in blocking ratification of the Protocol a State 
Department memorandum noted:  
We continue to encourage legislators and other folks here (well meaning and otherwise) 
to work for passage of the Protocol and Theodore. However, we see little reason to 
believe that our encouragement soon will bear fruit. Despite the squeeze on revenues, 
soaring dollar/gourde rates, unemployment, scandals and increasing hardships for all 
classes, after sorting through all the swirl of empty political maneuverings in Port-au-
Prince - the bottom line here remains unchanged - the politicians are afraid to take any 
decision to resolve the crisis that might at the same time provoke Michael Francoise and 
his tugs [FRAPH] to retaliate against them. The politicians are too divided, too venal and 
too gutless to stare down Francois and his tugs. Neither do the legislators have any 
confidence that the international community (read the USG) is likely to resolve the 
Francoise problem for them (though they continue attempts to explain to us that 
'somebody' must 'do something' about the [Francois] problem for there to be any prospect 
that the Protocol or Theodore will be ratified).[48]  
The Washington Protocol was, therefore, rejected by the parliament and Haiti's Supreme 
Court of Justice voted the international agreement unconstitutional. Emboldened after 
successfully rejecting the Washington Protocol, the de facto government proposed an 
alternative agreement - the Villa d'Accueil accord - that called for a government of 
national consensus that did not mention Aristide's return or the restoration of the 
democratic process. The accord represented the increasing intransigence of the de facto 
regime vis- à-vis the US and the international community.  
The new Clinton administration intensified the economic embargo that was imposed 
against Haiti. The embargo, however, had little economic effect on the Haitian military 
leaders themselves. The tightening of sanctions by the Clinton administration devastated 
Haiti's urban poor but enriched Haiti's military generals.[49] In the northeastern section 
of Haiti, the generals mitigated the effects of the UN's oil and trade embargo by opening 
new roads in the districts of Liberete, Terrire Rouge and Ouanaminthe, which are close to 
the porous border of the Dominican Republic. Through this border Haiti's military leaders 
enriched themselves by creating a lucrative black market for hard to obtain fuel and 
contraband goods. At the principal border crossing at Ouanaminthe, the Haitian junta 
levied exorbitant taxes on all merchandise that came into Haiti.[50]  
The international embargo, moreover, facilitated the conditions that encouraged Haiti's 
military leaders to secure economic rents through drug trafficking. The military junta was 
riddled with problems such as drug dealing and contraband activities. Under Cedras, the 
use of crack cocaine in the navy and other branches of the military had reached serious 
proportions.[51] US Defense intelligence reported that the Haitian coup leaders who 
deposed Aristide were routinely involved with drug trafficking in the southern districts of 
Les Cayes and the southeastern districts of Meyer/Geocoord and Jacmel. These Haitian 
officers were paid by Colombian narcotics traffickers to protect their cocaine shipments 
on route to the US and Europe. A US Defense intelligence report entitled, "FDH General 
Staff Officer Reportedly involved in Narcotic Trafficking" noted:  
A Colombian narcotrafficker named . . . gave [General] five kilos of cocaine on or about 
the 15 Mar 1991 in exchange for . . . protecting a drug load scheduled to arrive by air in 
Les Cayes the week of 25-29 Mar 91. [General] has dealt with narcotraffikers before. 
[General] controls a runway outside of Les Cayes. The load expected is approximately 
600 Kilos and will be arriving from Columbia . . .. The 600 Kilos would be transferred to 
a "Stash House" until transport to the US or Europe can be arranged.[52]  
The Haitian junta's drug related activities were also extensive in the southeastern districts 
of Haiti. US Defense intelligence again reported: "That once a week, around Wednesday 
or Thursday about 2100, a low flying plane is heard near the shore line in the vicinity of 
Meyer/Geocoord, to the east of Jacmel. Locals, who have been observing this for some 
time now, report that military personnel go out at night to receive the drug bundles."[53]  
The black market and drug smuggling activities of the Haitian generals provided these 
members of the de facto coalition with financial immunity against the tightened sanctions 
of the Clinton administration. To bolster the sanctions that were already in place the 
Clinton administration ordered a naval blockade of Haiti. The additional external pressure 
on Haiti brought Cedras back to negotiations that led to the Governors Island Accord. 
Under the US/UN brokered Governors Island Accord signed in July 1993, Aristide made 
concessions to the Haitian junta similar to the concessions granted under the Washington 
Protocol. The agreement included Aristide's appointment of a new prime minister; the 
lifting of the UN sanctions; the sharing of power between Aristide's Lavalas party and the 
Haitian business elite who financed the coup; parliamentary reforms of the Haitian army 
and police under the supervision of the UN; the proclamation of amnesty by Aristide for 
those involved in the coup; and the voluntary retirement of Cedras and other members of 
the Haitian high command on the return of Aristide which was scheduled for 30 October 
1993.[54]  
The Clinton administration in its eagerness to claim diplomatic victory for the apparent 
resolution of the crisis credited the international embargo with forcing the de facto 
military regime to come to the bargaining table and accept the restoration of the 
democratic process in Haiti.[55] The de facto coalition would again prove resilient in its 
ability to resist this latest attempt to return Aristide to power in Haiti. To implement the 
Governors Island Accord, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 
867 authorizing the establishment and immediate dispatch of the United Nations Mission 
in Haiti (UNMIH). The UNMIH comprised approximately 700 military and police 
personnel with the US and Canada largely providing the military component of the 
mission.[56] As specified by the agreement, the UNHIM, over a period of six months, 
would help in the modernization of the Haitian military, establish a new police force and 
oversee Aristide's return. When the ship, the USS Harlan County, carrying the UNHIM 
military contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince on 11 October 1993, FRAPH prevented the 
ship from casting anchor. FRAPH violently attacked foreign diplomats and local and 
international press personnel assembled to meet the troops at the harbor. The Harlan 
County was ordered to return to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and future attempts to deploy 
UNHIM troops to Haiti were blocked by the Pentagon and Republicans in the Congress 
who opposed efforts to restore Aristide to power.[57] In commenting on the de facto 
regime's resistance to Aristide's return and willingness to use force against potential 
defectors from the coalition, the US Defense intelligence noted:  
All signs point to Lt. Francois' determination to force a showdown with Aristide. 
Francois has reportedly stockpiled ammunition during the last few months, and his 
increasing reliance on the attaches [FRAPH] reveals a willingness to use force to achieve 
his aims. It is highly likely that the return of Aristide will be greeted by outbreaks of 
violence orchestrated by [FRAPH]. The violence will be directed against leading figures 
in the interim government and any group supportive of the ousted President's return.[58]  
The Fragmentation of the De Facto Coalition, October 1993-94  
Between September 1991 to October 1993, the de facto coalition remained cohesive in its 
defiance of the international community's demand for the return of Aristide and the 
restoration of democracy. US external coercion did not induce any changes in the internal 
distribution of power within the de facto coalition and the coalition remained cohesive in 
its efforts in rejecting both the Washington Protocol and the Governors Island Accord. 
However, as the crisis with the US government continued, coupled with the 
implementation of stiffer external sanctions, various members of the de facto coalition 
were affected differently. The intensification of external coercion increased the power 
and capabilities of FRAPH relative to the other members of the de facto coalition. These 
changes in the internal distribution of power within the coalition reduced the distribution 
of benefits for the business elite and threatened to displace the military high command as 
a dominant player within the army and the coalition. Between November 1993 and 
September 1994, as the power and benefits of these members began to diminish, they 
increasingly preferred a strategy of defection as opposed to continued resistance of US 
pressure.  
The Haitian Business Elite  
While the business elite was not affected by the voluntary sanctions of the Bush 
administration, stiffer sanctions enforced by the Clinton administration eroded their 
financial security and ultimately reduced the benefits of pursuing a strategy of remaining 
within the coalition. Like most developing countries, the economic viability of the 
Haitian business elite in the financial, industrial and export sectors of the Haitian 
economy are largely dependent on the capital flows generated by foreign subsidiaries that 
operate in Haiti. Such dependence is established through joint venture arrangements with 
foreign capital, and through a range of financial services that the local business elite 
provides for their foreign partners and clients.[59] These include contracting, outsourcing 
and banking services. For example, Industries Nationales Reunies S.A. (INR), owned by 
Haitian businessman, Andre Apaid, provided contracting services to American 
corporations. The most successful division of INR, Alpha Electronics, "assembles 
electronic products for Sperry/Unisys, IBM, Remington and Honeywell."[60]  
The tighter sanctions enforced by the Clinton administration prevented American 
companies from exporting component parts to Haitian subsidiaries and contracting 
companies in the manufacture and export sectors. The administration also denied import 
licenses to US subsidiaries in Haiti. As a result of these tightened sanctions, employment 
in Haiti's manufacturing sector, which was estimated at 150,000 in the mid-1980s, 
dropped to approximately 10,000 by late 1993. In addition, American subsidiaries in the 
banking, transportation, communications, electronics and manufacturing sectors began 
divesting from Haiti.[61] Given their dependence on foreign capital, Haiti's private sector 
began to suffer as foreign capital took flight.  
By late 1993, stiffer sanctions disrupted the economic payoff structure of the business 
elite and provided them with the necessary incentives to defect and accept the diplomatic 
carrots and concessions that they had rejected earlier under the Washington Protocol and 
Governors Island Accord. The business elite began to reconsider its alliance with the de 
facto regime. The US Department of Defense noted that "although the financial and 
political elite are still sheltered, their protection is starting to wear thin and they are the 
loudest in their complaints"[62] against the de facto military junta. One Haitian 
businessman who supplied food to the military noted:  
I frankly was quite happy with the coup . . . I do not like Aristide, and thought maybe 
Cedras would be another Pinochet. But he is not. He is a failure, and now we have to 
accept the fact that Aristide is president. All we can do is hope the international 
community keeps him from his own worst instincts.[63]  
Another businessman stated:  
It is not the traditional bourgeoisie that are actively opposing Aristide now, it is the young 
guys [FRAPH] who made a lot of money after the coup, who have a certain lifestyle and 
are not about to give it up. They have no money outside the country, nothing to fall back 
on, so it is all or nothing.[64]  
One businessman noted that he was now "absolutely sure that Francois controls 
everything. He is the center of the Mafia. We did not understand this at first. And Cedras 
is a willing partner."[65]  
The Military High Command  
Although the military high command enjoyed economic rents even under a tightened 
international embargo, the sanctions indirectly altered the internal structure of the junta's 
political power. The enforcement of stiffer sanctions created a black market for oil and 
contraband goods that was controlled by the military high command. Economic sanctions 
generated windfall profits for the high command which they used to finance the 
expansion of FRAPH in order to repress the Haitian democratic sector and terrorize the 
general population.[66] US Defense intelligence reported that by the end of 1993, 
FRAPH expanded to over 10,000 members and established local chapters in every major 
city in Haiti. By December 1993, the power of the paramilitary was firmly entrenched in 
Port Au Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, Port De Paix, Jacmel, Jeremie, St. Marc, 
Miragoane, Petit Goave and Mont Rouis.[67] US Defense intelligence reported:  
FRAPH will continue to expand as long as this confrontation . . . between the 
international community and Haiti exists. The longer the confrontation lasts and the 
greater the sanctions, the more Haitian society will become polarized and nationalistic. 
This will provide an incredible fertile terrain for FRAPH recruiters. Should the crisis be 
resolved with the lifting of the embargo and a return to constitutional order, FRAPH will 
lose a lot of its adherents. Eventually, FRAPH would become insignificant because its 
'raison d' tre' would no longer exist.[68]  
Sanctions allowed the military high command to bankroll the development and 
mobilization of a "beast" that they could not control. Given FRAPH's expansion and its 
autonomy from the military command structure the paramilitary organization operated 
beyond the control of the military high command. FRAPH became a major threat to the 
high command's source of power. The high command's dominant position of power 
within the de facto regime was ensured by its ability to control and maintain the integrity 
of the military's command structure. FRAPH, however, threatened the high command's 
control over the army by undermining the integrity of the military's command structure 
and by its attempts to displace the local power and authority of the military throughout 
much of Haiti's rural provinces.  
The extensive growth and activities of FRAPH challenged the authority of the military's 
departmental commanders. Haitian army commanders feared that the paramilitary 
organization would displace the military as the focus of local power. Clashes between 
members of FRAPH and members of the military hierarchy escalated. Some of these 
clashes involved army commanders themselves. In most cases these clashes were 
attributed to FRAPH's attempt to usurp the power and prerogative of the local military in 
their desire to intimidate the local population.[69] There were also armed confrontations 
between FRAPH and military personnel belonging to the Headquarters Defense Unit 
(HDU), formerly the Presidential Guard.[70]  
The command structure within the Haitian military continued to be undermined as a 
result of the increased confrontations between FRAPH and the provincial military 
leadership. Resenting the fact that the paramilitary group now threatened their authority, 
local military commanders began to assert themselves and take actions independent of the 
directives of the high command. This tension between local commanders and the high 
command resulted in some institutional power shift from the capital to the Haitian 
provinces.[71] With the erosion of the command structure, the high command 
increasingly became isolated politically from the military's enlisted men and they grew 
suspicious of the motives of Cedras during the course of his negotiations with Mr. 
Caputo, the UN/OAS special envoy to Haiti. The suspicion that Cedras had negotiated a 
secret deal for himself and the other members of the high command that may have 
permitted the return of Aristide, preempted a mutiny by enlisted men against their 
commanding officers at Camp D'Application.[72]Concerned about the growing 
fragmentation of the military's command structure, the US State Department noted that "a 
rift in the army . . . is precisely what Aristide is angling for - bringing down Cedras by his 
own troops and in the process opening the route for a people's revolution."[73] By the 
beginning of 1994, it became apparent that the Haitian high command had lost the base of 
its support among its own forces. According to US Defense intelligence:  
Cedras, Biamby and their inner circle of civilian advisers are becoming increasingly 
isolated politically because they may have lost their power base. Without Lt-Col 
Francois' unconditional support, with questionable support from the Headquarters 
Defense Unit (Presidential Guard) or the Heavy Weapons Company, and FRAPH more 
strategically aligned with Lt-Col Francois, Cedras and Biamby can no longer project the 
image of strength they once did.[74] 
The political vulnerability of Cedras, the erosion of the high command's power within the 
military and the attempt by FRAPH to displace the local power of military commanders, 
were factors that radically eroded the power that Cedras and other members of the high 
command enjoyed within the de facto coalition. In light of the high command's 
diminished power within the military vis- à-vis FRAPH, the diplomatic concessions that 
the US had previously offered the generals now appeared attractive and the military high 
command began to forge a diplomatic strategy that would gradually accommodate the US 
demands for Aristide's return.  
In the face of the intractable reality that the international community intended to restore 
Aristide combined with the domestic reality of their diminished power, key members of 
the de facto coalition with the exception of FRAPH began to restructure their bargaining 
strategy vis- à-vis the US. The de facto prime minister began hosting negotiations with 
private sector representatives in the National Palace. Private meetings were held at the 
home of General Cedras with a group of 50 Citibank clients, 50-60 business sector 
representatives of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Board members of Haiti's 
Sogebank, a powerful private sector bank. Most of these discussions focused on the 
private sector's fears that Aristide would retaliate and unleash mobs against his political 
enemies. Those who financed the coup against Aristide now met in secret to tally the cost 
of his return.[75]  
One outcome of these meetings was the signing of the United Nations Accord that 
suspended the worldwide fuel embargo against Haiti in exchange for further negotiations 
for Aristide's return. In addition, there were talks with the United Nations to secure 
approval to use Haiti's Bowen air field to land an estimated 560-man United Nations 
force to help implement the democratic transition. While the Haitian bourgeoisie 
applauded these actions, Michael Francois and FRAPH opposed them. According to State 
Department reports:  
Francois' behavior has changed to the point that he is reluctant to follow the orders and 
instructions from the senior military officers in Haiti . . . [And in terms of the UN request 
to land UN forces at Bowen airfield] Francoise feel betrayed and may possibly attempt to 
foment internal resistance . . .. Amassing up to 10,000 members of the civilian police 
attaché [FRAPH] and auxiliary forces [to block the initiative].[76]  
Michael Francois and FRAPH  
The conflict between the Haitian high command and Francois also centered on the 
diplomatic concessions that were offered by the US government. These included the 
separation of the police and the army, the professionalization and reform of the military, 
the reorganization of the police, and the offer of amnesty and early retirement for 
members of the general staff. Since FRAPH was Francois' principal source of power 
within the de facto coalition, any effort on the part of the generals to reform the police 
and army would eliminate the justification for maintaining the paramilitary group and 
hence terminate the high command's major source of internal threat. While these 
diplomatic concessions were becoming increasingly appealing to Cedras they were 
unacceptable to Francois. Moreover, Francois opposed the idea of being forced into early 
retirement - a central pre-condition for Aristide's return. Francois became convinced that 
both Cedras and Biamby were attempting to cut a deal with the US that would exclude 
him, FRAPH and the military's enlisted men who remained opposed to Aristide's return. 
In light of the Haitian high command's weakened political position within the de facto 
coalition and consequently its changed bargaining strategy toward the US government for 
the return of Aristide, the US Defense intelligence noted:  
Lt.-Colonel Michael Francois admitted that the he believes that the 'divorce' between him 
and the Fad'H High Command is final . . . Francois opined that both he and his 1981 
peers, [military academy Graduating Class of 1981] unlike the class of 1973 officers like 
Cedras and Biamby, have many years left in the service and should at least hedge their 
chances for continued active duty service. Francois stated that he followed Cedras and 
Biamby blindly these last two years, but now feels not only abandoned but betrayed by 
Biamby especially, who is increasingly trying to undermine Francois for the sake of his 
own political ambitions [vis- à-vis the US]. Francois views himself as the guarantor of his 
comrade's professional welfare . . . [And] under no condition would he accept to resign 
from the military . . . Michael Francois has started charting his own course in the past few 
weeks separate from the machinations of Generals Cedras and Biamby.[77]  
The diplomatic concessions that the US government offered Haiti's high command 
largely isolated FRAPH; and given the growth in its size and power the best strategy for 
the paramilitary group vis- à-vis the US was continued resistance via a possible coup 
d'état against the high command who was poised to defect. By December 1993, anti-
Aristide hard-liners within the de facto coalition that were allied with FRAPH, known as 
"Cedras Kitchen Cabinet" sought to remove Cedras from power when the situation 
presented itself. US Defense intelligence reported that:  
The extreme right within the military may set aside Cedras and help form a new 
government. This extreme right element within the military is identified as Cedras 
'Kitchen Cabinet', made up of Col. Dorelien, Ltc Michel Francois, TI Parris, Romeo 
Aloun and probably Col. Prud Homme. They believe that General Cedras has become an 
obstacle to their interests. Now with the support of FRAPH, they don't need him any 
longer to maintain control over the army and the population.[78]  
The increasingly vulnerable position of the high command within the army prompted the 
possibility that Francois would oust Cedras. In monitoring the changing dynamics within 
the de facto military coalition the US State Department noted:  
It seems increasingly likely to us, that barring effective action against him by Cedras, that 
eventually Francois, or a surrogate, will make his play for power. Whether he will limit 
initial actions to dissolving the Parliament and/or replacing Cedras also remains to be 
seen. He may judge it beneficial to leave Nerette/Honorat (who also seem favorable to 
the idea of getting rid of Parliament) in place - at least until he can assess the 
international community reaction.[79]  
Given the continued erosion of his own position within the military and the internal threat 
that FRAPH now represented, by September 1994, after six months of diplomatic 
deadlock with the international community, Cedras re-opened negotiations with the US 
government via Jimmy Carter. President Clinton dispatched the Carter mission to Haiti 
that ultimately produced the Port Au Prince Agreement.  
The Decision to Comply  
On 18 September 1994, with a US-led invasion of Haiti imminent, former US president 
Jimmy Carter signed the Port Au Prince Agreement with Haiti's de facto President Emile 
Jonassaint that provided for General Cedras and the military regime he headed to resign 
from power by 15 October. The Port Au Prince Agreement also provided for the 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions which authorized the US-led 
coalition to use all "necessary means" to remove the military junta from power. On 19 
September, the US-led multinational force entered Haiti peacefully with the goal of 
ensuring a safe and secure environment for the transition back to constitutional 
government. With Aristide's approval, a special session of parliament was convened on 
28 September to vote on legislation that immediately granted amnesty to the military high 
command and the creation of a national police force - one that was separate from the 
army and under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. After three years in exile 
President Aristide returned to Haiti on 15 October 1994.  
In explaining the successful diplomatic outcome of the Haitian crisis many in the US 
foreign policy establishment emphasize exclusively the external coercive elements of US 
diplomacy. They assert that the de facto junta's decision to comply on 18 September 1994 
was the direct result of Clinton's 13 September ultimatum and the last minute mission of 
Carter, Powell and Nunn who convinced the junta that a military invasion would follow if 
talks for Aristide's return failed. Robert Pastor, personal advisor to the Carter mission to 
the junta, maintains that it was the credibility of the military threat that proved essential 
in reaching an agreement with the Haitian junta. However, Pastor also noted that once 
Cedras had learned that the invasion was already in progress he refused to sign the 
agreement or have further negotiations.[80] Given this reading, it is not at all clear that 
the threat of invasion was the sole crucial factor in the junta's decision to comply with US 
demands. If Cedras was willing to sign the agreement when he did not know that the 
American invasion was underway why then was he willing to end negotiations when he 
did know that American troops were headed for Haiti? It appears that the threat of US 
military invasion was not the only factor that produced compliance and may have even 
encouraged resistance on the part of the Haitian junta had it not been for the domestic 
fragmentation of the de facto coalition.  
The conventional explanation for the success of American diplomacy in restoring 
democracy in Haiti then is only partially correct. Missing from the account is an analysis 
of the importance of domestic intervening variables within Haiti that processed the 
external coercive pressures and ultimately produced the successful diplomatic outcome. 
This analysis of the junta's decision to comply is multiplicative. Essentially, in the 
absence of the internal fragmentation of the de facto coalition, the increasing political 
vulnerability and weakness of Cedras within the Haitian military, the Carter mission 
would not have been successful. US coercive diplomatic pressure and the threat to 
intervene were necessary but not sufficient to produce the Port Au Prince Agreement. 
Clinton's ultimatum and the threat of military intervention was more effective in 
September 1994 when the de facto coalition collapsed as opposed to 1993 when the 
coalition was cohesive and able to resist the US military force that was sent to implement 
the Governors Island Accord. The Haitian junta's decision to comply must be placed 
within the context of the disintegration of the de facto coalition that preceded both the 
military threat and the Carter mission. In emphasizing the importance of the domestic 
vulnerability of Cedras in the junta's decision to comply, the UN reported that:  
Cedras' position within the Haitian military had deteriorated to such a degree that he had 
no choice but to resign and go into exile. His lack of field experience and contact with his 
troops reduced the support he received from the Forces Armees d'Haiti (FAD'H) . . . 
General Cedras' authority had also been eroded by the military's lack of professionalism 
and cohesion.[81]  
To argue that the junta's decision to comply with US demands for Aristide's return was in 
part a function of the disintegration of the de facto coalition may seem to suggest that the 
de facto junta was never fully unified from the outset of the conflict with the US 
government. Moreover, FRAPH's desire to topple Cedras could be interpreted as a 
consistent historical pattern of Haitian politics where coups have been the means of 
circulating elites in and out of power. In fact, the coup d'état on 30 September 1991 that 
ousted Aristide was merely a continuation of a pattern in which coups were the normal 
mechanism for the transfer of political power in Haiti. For example, on 17 January 1988, 
Leslie Manigat was elected president and by 19 June 1988 he was ousted in a coup led by 
General Namphy. By 17 September 1988, General Namphy was ousted in a coup led by 
Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril. By 2 April 1989, General Avril survived a coup attempt by high-
ranking generals but stepped down on 10 March 1990.  
Given this history, how unified was the de facto coalition that deposed Aristide? And was 
the behavior of FRAPH consistent with the historical logic of Haitian politics? It has been 
argued that the unity among members of the de facto coalition centered on their intrinsic 
and instrumental preferences. Intrinsic in the sense that they were all ideologically 
opposed to Haiti's democratic experiment and to the prospect of its resumption. The unity 
of the de facto coalition was also based on instrumental preferences in the sense that the 
policies of the Aristide government threatened the political and economic power of the 
military and business elite. Evidence of this unity was shown in the de facto coalition's 
resolute rejection of the US government's efforts to return Aristide via the Washington 
Protocol and the Governors Island Accord. Moreover, it is argued that the behavior of 
FRAPH is not consistent with the historical pattern of Haitian politics. The demise of 
regimes throughout much of Haiti's political history was linked directly to the dynamics 
of Haiti's internal politics.[82] The expansion and mobilization of FRAPH and the 
conflict between Cedras and Francois were induced by external political and economic 
coercion. The eventual fragmentation of the de facto coalition was the direct consequence 
of the ways in which external coercion altered the distribution of political power within 
the coalition by reducing the power of the military high command while increasing the 
power and influence of FRAPH.  
CONCLUSION  
This analysis has attempted to answer the question: under what conditions is Type C 
coercive diplomacy likely to succeed? By integrating the literatures of coercive 
diplomacy and conflict and cohesion, this analysis has sought to advance five theoretical 
propositions that were tested by the case study analysis of US coercive diplomatic efforts 
in restoring democracy in Haiti.  
These theoretical propositions were confirmed by the finding from the case study which 
showed that the success of Type C coercive diplomacy is a function of the time duration 
over which external coercion is exercised. As the time duration of external coercion 
increases stress among the target's coalition members is likely to increase. As a 
consequence of externally induced stress, coalition members are more likely to 
renegotiate the internal distribution of power within the coalition whereby some members 
will attempt to increase their political power at the expense of diminishing the power of 
others. Under these conditions, coalition members are more likely to adopt competitive 
bargaining strategies to resolve the conflict with the external power. Coalition members 
whose internal political power has diminished are more likely to defect and bargain for an 
optimal accommodation with the external power. On the other hand, coalition members 
whose political power has increased have a greater incentive to adopt bargaining 
solutions that will resist the demands of the external power. Therefore, given time and 
stress that results from conflict, an external power can encourage the target's coalition 
members to pursue multiple and competitive bargaining solutions to the crisis and 
effectively facilitate a process in which domestic coalitions fragment, members defect 
and compliance becomes possible.  
The success of US coercive diplomacy toward Haiti underscores the importance of time 
in assessing the impact of external coercion. Stress among members of the de facto 
coalition increased as the time duration of the conflict with the US increased. In the first 
two years of the conflict, the de facto coalition remained cohesive and successfully 
resisted US coercive pressures. During this time period, de facto coalition members 
sought to consolidate their power within the de facto regime and adopted a similar 
strategy in response to US external pressures (see summary of actors' strategies in the 
Appendix). With increases in US external coercion, however, stress among coalition 
members increased as the crisis prolonged. Indicative of this stress was the attempt by 
FRAPH to alter the distribution of power within the coalition. FRAPH's power within the 
regime increased while it diminished the power and benefits for the military high 
command and the business elite. As a result, by late 1993, the de facto coalition began to 
unravel as coalition members adopted competitive bargaining solutions in response to US 
external pressure. The military high command and business elite pursued a strategy of 
defection and sought an accommodation with the US for Aristide's return. Since FRAPH 
would be terminated with the return of democratic and constitutional rule, the 
paramilitary organization continued to pursue a strategy of resistance against US pressure 
by attempting to eliminate the military high command and usurp control of the army. The 
Haitian case shows that the duration of time, stress among coalition members, the 
changes in the distribution of power within the coalition and the adoption of multiple and 
competing bargaining solutions to resolve the external conflict were the necessary 
intervening domestic variables that interacted with each other as well as with US external 
coercion to produce compliance.  
The findings from this analysis have important policy implications for the resolution of 
current and future international conflict via coercive diplomacy. In light of the recent 
bombing of Iraq and US policy discussions that are now centered on removing the Iraqi 
leadership from power, this analysis is of particular importance in attempting to realize 
this Type C goal. American policy options that stress air strikes and the armed 
mobilization of Iraqi opposition groups against the regime could solidify the regime and 
end in failure. The policy implications from the Haitian case suggests that policy makers 
must deploy coercive measures to affect specific coalition members within the Iraqi 
regime, with the objective of fragmenting the coalition. To achieve Iraqi compliance 
under Type C diplomatic conditions, American policy makers must refine current 
coercive measures so that they can alter the target's internal distribution of power, erode 
cohesion and thereby encourage defection. To accomplish this objective, American 
policy makers must acquire what Alexander George calls "generic knowledge" of the 
individual interests of coalition members within the Iraqi government and be willing to 
employ greater diplomatic skill in structuring the mix of coercive measures aimed at 
disrupting the benefits that each coalition member enjoys.  
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from the political 
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Lifting of sanctions; 
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capital; halt in 
financial erosion; 
economic growth; 
power sharing with 
Aristide in new govt.  
The Coercive Strategies 
of US Diplomacy    
 Utility   
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End crisis and the 
Haitian refugee crisis 
in Florida which 
benefits Democratic 
Party in upcoming 
Congressional 
elections.  
B. Maintain economic 
embargo  
Aggravate Haitian 
refugee problem in 
Florida.  
Force de facto 
military govt to 
comply.  
C. Reorganization/ 
Professionalization of the 
Military.  
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Termination of the 




in drug trafficking.  
D. Amnesty for military 
high command from 
charges of human rights 
violations.  
Protracted 
resistance from the 
paramilitary.  
Induce compliance 
among military high 
command and isolate 
paramilitary.  
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